Quantized visual awareness by W. A. Escobar
“fpsyg-04-00869” — 2013/11/21 — 10:54 — page 1 — #1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE




Department of Biology, Rollins Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Edited by:
Melanie Boly, Belgian National Fund
for Scientiﬁc Research, USA
Reviewed by:
Guido Hesselmann, Charité Campus
Mitte, Germany
Melanie Boly, Belgian National Fund
for Scientiﬁc Research, USA
*Correspondence:
W. A. Escobar, Department of Biology,
Rollins Research Center, Emory
University, 1510 Clifton Road, Atlanta,
GA 30322, USA
e-mail: alexander.escobar@emory.edu
The proposed model holds that, at its most fundamental level, visual awareness is
quantized.That is to say that visual awareness arises as individual bits of awareness through
the action of neural circuits with hundreds to thousands of neurons in at least the human
striate cortex. Circuits with speciﬁc topologies will reproducibly result in visual awareness
that correspond to basic aspects of vision like color, motion, and depth. These quanta
of awareness (qualia) are produced by the feedforward sweep that occurs through the
geniculocortical pathway but are not integrated into a conscious experience until recurrent
processing from centers like V4 or V5 select the appropriate qualia being produced in V1 to
create a percept.Themodel proposed here has the potential to shift the focus of the search
for visual awareness to the level of microcircuits and these likely exist across the kingdom
Animalia. Thus establishing qualia as the fundamental nature of visual awareness will not
only provide a deeper understanding of awareness, but also allow for a more quantitative
understanding of the evolution of visual awareness throughout the animal kingdom.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroscience has made great strides in understanding the struc-
ture and workings of vertebrate brains. Nowhere is this more
evident than in describing the functional architecture of the
mammalian, and more speciﬁcally, the primate visual sensory
pathway and cortices. Over the past century, neuroscience has
evolved from rudimentary understandings of neurons to investi-
gating the nature of visual awareness and the neural correlates
of consciousness (NCC). The NCC are deﬁned as the mini-
mal neural activities (circumscribed by the neural circuits and
centers involved) required to generate a conscious experience
(Koch and Braun, 1996; Tononi and Koch, 2008). Although great
advances have been made in identifying the circuits and centers
that process speciﬁc aspects of vision, it is still not clear how the
activity of these circuits and centers generates our inner visual
experience.
Much research indicates that a high-level of integration is
required to generate our subjective experience of vision with many
of the identiﬁed centers prodigiously interacting with each other
(Edelman et al., 2011). This level of integration corresponds well
with our daily experience of the outer world since we humans have
a holistic experience of the outerworld. That is to say that our inner
subjective experience is not fragmented but completely integrated
with depth, color, and motion all imbedded within our overall
visual experience. Indeed, this holistic-level experience is so com-
mon that it is hard to conceptualize anything different. I believe
our intimate connection with our personal visual experience has
biased our approach in thinking about vision and the questions
that are currently being asked about visual awareness in neuro-
science. For example, there is an assumption that visual awareness
only exists at the level of our complete human experience, but few
current researchers have asked the question of whether awareness
is quantized or can exist at a smaller level independent of our
overall visual experience.
Many in the past have discussed the idea of quantized visual
awareness (perceptual atoms) and it is clear that philosophers as far
back as Hume and Descartes were considering concepts related to
the questions proposed above (Julesz and Schumer, 1981; Garrett,
1997). The reason these philosophical assertions have persisted is
that the concept of quantized awareness is in line with what we
know about nature. Indeed, if we take the wider perspective of
scientiﬁc discoveries over the past few centuries, it is clear that
nature operates on this principle of quanta, and this applies to
more abstract forms of nature like energy (Bohr, 1913; Planck,
1914).
All forms of energy and matter in the universe appear to be
quantized. In other words, there is some smallest unit that still
retains the qualities associated with whatever form one studies.
Examples of this are found all around us and include: atoms (ele-
mental matter), cells (life), and photons (energy). Given that this
is a general principle of nature, it stands to reason that the same
should apply to the natural phenomenon of visual awareness.
Another way of stating the same is “Why should visual awareness
be the exception to the rule?”
THEORY
Although we tend to think of information in a symbolic way, in
nature information is represented as structure or gradients (e.g.,
electrochemical). Given that the brain is a natural system, it is likely
the information that leads to a visual experience has a structural
component.
In the ﬁeld of the philosophy of mind and in psychology,
it has become routine to label inner-subjective experiences, like
seeing the color blue, as qualia (Searle, 1997; Edelman et al.,
2011). Thus, any personal experience of the outer world would
include a great many qualia describing the various aspects of the
scene in which one ﬁnds herself/himself. The hypothesis proposed
here states that at its most fundamental level, visual awareness is
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composed of quanta of awareness or qualia1. Each one of these
qualia is produced by neural circuits comprised of hundreds to
thousands of neurons, and it is the unique topologies of these
circuits that result in distinct, speciﬁc, and reproducible qualia2.
Thus, a neural circuit with a speciﬁc topology will reliably repro-
duce the same bit of awareness that corresponds to perceiving
the color blue, while another topology results in perceiving the
color red.
The physical manifestation of a quale is not the neural circuit
itself but the electromagnetic ﬁeld (EMF) produced by the active
neural circuits. Each unique neural circuit should produce a dis-
tinct EMF pattern and it is the EMF pattern that is the physical
aspect of a quale. A corollary to this hypothesis is that the produc-
tion of qualia is not dependent on the material making the circuit
itself and therefore it should be possible to make synthetic qualia
in the laboratory by designing circuits that mimic the topology
of circuits identiﬁed in primate brains that produce qualia. This
corollary marks a signiﬁcant break with philosophical proposals
made in the past about perceptual atoms or qualia (Julesz and
Schumer, 1981; Llinás and Churchland, 1996)3.
The contribution to our overall visual experience of each quale
is small. A metaphor used in a previous communication is that we
can consider each quale as a pixel in a computer screen (Escobar,
2011). The big difference being that a quale does not represent a
speciﬁc color but awareness of the color itself. Moreover, qualia
are so small compared to our overall visual ﬁeld that they are
hard to experience individually. Our subjective visual experience
requires the integration of a large number of these qualia, and
this integrated state is the level of experience that correlates most
closely with our common everyday vision.
Although it may appear that this hypothesis requires a multi-
plicity of different types of qualia, it is likely a few diverse types
could be used to create a great number of different visual states.
For example, we might only need three color qualia to synthesize
all perceived colors in the same way red, blue, and green pixels
1The term quale (pl. qualia) is associated with internal perceptions of outer phe-
nomena. For example, the perception of the color blue in your visual ﬁeld would
be considered a quale. Although I maintain this general deﬁnition for qualia in this
article, I am redeﬁning the scope of a quale to be a quantum of awareness. Included
in this redeﬁnition is the assumption that the contribution of a quale is increasingly
small compared to our overall visual experience, and that a patch of blue in our ﬁeld
of view would require the integration of many qualia for this percept to be created.
2The estimate for the number of neurons participating in a circuit that creates a
quale is based on estimations of the volume of an ocular dominance column. The
cerebral cortex is about 2 mm thick (Hubel et al., 1978), and the average dimensions
for ODC is 1 mm (Cheng et al., 2001) by 0.1 mm. The latter dimension is given due
to the signiﬁcant scattering of receptive ﬁelds in the movement of electrodes by as
little as 0.1 mm. I am assuming neural cells with a cell body diameter of 20 μm
(pyramidal cell) and, to simplify, assuming the cells are shaped like cubes.
3It is clear that many of the philosophical proposals that were previously put forth
suffered from a dearth of knowledge of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
available today about the visual cortices of primates. For instance, the further back
one goes in time, one can see that philosophers struggled more often with the
question of whether our human awareness was connected to the physiology of the
brain or perhaps existed in a state apart from the brain. It has become obvious, that
the ideas of Patricia Churchland and others are closer to the true state of the matter
in that it appears the functioning of the brain results in awareness. More correctly,
it is the activity of certain neural circuits that is visual awareness. The physiological
activity and aware state are one and the same – two different aspects of the same
process.
are used to create a variety of colors on computer screens. Besides
color qualia, there must also be qualia types that correspond to
different aspects of vision. For instance, there are likely qualia that
produce the sensations of depth, motion, or orientation. Once
again, varying the number and combination of these few qualia
types could create a large variety of experiences.
The ideas described in the previous paragraph parallel the
structure and function of biological systems. A countless vari-
ety of proteins in biological systems with wide-ranging properties
result from covalently linking varying numbers of the same twenty
amino acids. The complex andhighly structured tissues andorgans
of our bodies are created from a limited set of approximately
200 cell types. Recombining four distinct nucleotides into diverse
nucleic acid sequences creates the immensenumber of genes found
in biological systems.
The reason this approach is employed at all levels in biologi-
cal systems is that it allows for the production of a vast number of
complex structures froma limited set of buildingblocks. Thismax-
imizes structural diversity with a minimal investment of energy.
Given the constantly changing, highly diverse environments we
encounter, it seems likely that the same evolutionary pressures
that have produced the complex structures of our bodies would
also select for a visual system that could represent a vast number of
possible environments from a limited set of qualia building blocks.
Not all neural circuits produce qualia. I believe that most do
not with clear examples of these being the circuits that produce
automated responses like the knee-jerk response. Qualia require
circuits with speciﬁc topologies containing hundreds to thousands
of neurons and even all of these do not result in qualia.We are born
with a surplus of neurons and circuits in our brains. Circuits that
are activated through our experience are retained while those that
are not are diminished. Gerald Edelman has described this process
as neuronal group selection (Edelman, 1992; Edelman et al., 2011).
This concept must apply to qualia and we can say that neural
circuits producing qualia that effectively describe our environment
and aid in our survival will be enhanced and maintained while
those circuits that do not will be degraded.
Although I do discuss ideas about how qualia are initially inte-
grated in order to understand how this qualia proposal ﬁts in with
what is known about the circuitry of primate visual cortices, the
process of binding various aspects of vision into an overall visual
experience is not the focus of this paper. There are various schools
of thought on how different attributes of what we perceive are
bound together; for example, the ideas of Crick and Koch on tem-
poral synchronization (Crick, 1995; Llinás and Churchland, 1996;
Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011). This issue of bind-
ing, however, is altogether a different question than whether or
not visual awareness is quantized or whether individual quanta of
awareness can serve as fundamental units of visual awareness.
The model proposed here has the potential to shift the focus of
the search for visual awareness to the level of microcircuits. Obvi-
ously, this would have implications for the ﬁelds of neurobiology,
psychology, and philosophy of mind, but beyond these the idea of
quantized awareness could open the doors to a quantitative dis-
cussion of the evolution of awareness. The focus is no longer the
maximally complex central nervous systems of mammals or pri-
mates but perhaps any organism that displays these microcircuits
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(no matter how simple the organism). In other words, the dis-
cussion of awareness becomes much more expansive since we can
look for and identify certain neural circuit topologies throughout
the animal kingdom, and in the process, create a phylogeny of
visual awareness.
EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT
Support for the existence of qualia is given by the detailed structure
of the cerebral cortex itself. When probed at microscopic scales,
we ﬁnd the cortex is composed of a myriad of local circuits that
are communicating with each other. Although many centers have
been identiﬁed in the visual cortex, each of these is composed of
many microcircuits that process information locally and then send
off their data to other centers or communicate with other local
circuits. Ramón y Cajal (1899) and other researchers observed this
architecture over a century ago.
More recently, the work of David Hubel and Torten Wiesel
demonstrated the presence of a large number of highly orga-
nized neural circuits they referred to as ocular dominance columns
(ODCs; Hubel, 1959; Hubel and Wiesel, 1959, 1968). These
columns are packed tightly together in the part of the visual cor-
tex known as the primary visual cortex (V1 or striate cortex), and
each corresponds to a speciﬁc location in our visual ﬁeld (Hubel
et al., 1978; Cheng et al., 2001; Adams et al., 2007). V1 is the ﬁrst
cortical structure to receive visual information, and it is believed
to operate at a rudimentary level in generating vision. Despite its
basic role, however, V1 is thought to process the initial stages of
various aspects of vision like color and motion. For example, the
complex cells found in ODCs respond most actively when a line of
a speciﬁc orientationmoves through their corresponding receptive
ﬁeld. Moreover, Hubel and Wiesel identiﬁed areas of V1 known as
blobs that respond strongly to colored stimuli (Hubel, 1983).
The qualia model proposed here offers that these well-known
and described ODCs are more than way stations for visual infor-
mation and serve as the seat of visual awareness. That is to say
that activated ODCs found in V1 of several primates (includ-
ing humans) produce bits of awareness corresponding to color,
motion, orientation, or depth and that the highly organized struc-
ture of V1 itself allows for these qualia to be appropriately mapped
into our overall visual awareness (Adams et al., 2007). Most impor-
tantly, these bits of awareness can exist independently of whether
they are integrated into a conscious visual experience.
This proposal forces us to think about awareness in a funda-
mentally different way because we must consider that it is possible
to have bits of awareness within our striate cortex that are indepen-
dent of visual perception. There seems to be a contradiction here
since how can there be any visual awareness that is independent
from our conscious experience? Most current models that aim to
explain visual awareness do not allow for this condition. However,
there is a form of visual awareness that is not well understood and
seems to demonstrate these properties in humans. This odd case
of perception was ﬁrst described in the 1970s by Weiskrantz and
others and is known as blindsight (Weiskrantz et al., 1974; Koch
and Braun, 1996; Milner, 1998; Tong, 2003).
Blindsight occurs when lesions toV1 completely eliminate con-
scious visual perception. Individuals with Type 1 blindsight report
they can no longer perceive visual stimuli including seeingmotion,
color, shapes, or any other visual cues. A typical experiment
would be to ask a patient to choose the direction of a right or
left moving object. Strangely enough, when blindsight patients
are probed under forced-choice conditions, they respond with
the correct answer at a frequency greater than chance regarding
visual stimuli (Azzopardi andCowey, 1998). Indeed, these patients
are often surprised by their success rate in these forced-choice
experiments. Thus, it appears that individuals do retain a form of
awareness that is not directly tied to the patient’s experienced per-
ception. Although blindsight is most often associated with activity
in extrastriate cortices, it nonetheless demonstrates that a form of
awareness can exist independent of conscious experience.
Lamme (2001, 2003) has proposed a model for the produc-
tion of conscious visual experiences. In his model, he separates
the feed-forward sweep (FFS) of the geniculocortical pathway
from the recurrent processing that follows the activation of higher
visual centers. The FFS is the rapid (∼50 ms) progression of
neural signals through V1 and onto higher centers like V3, V4,
V5, and the inferior temporal cortex (ITC). Recurrent processing
occurs only after a region is activated by the FFS (100–150 ms).
According to Lamme, the FFS is an unconscious process while
recurrent processing (for example, from V4 or V5 to previously
activated centers like V1) results in phenomenal consciousness.
Phenomenal consciousness relates to an experience that is not
fully conscious. An example is given by Block when he describes
the sensation one has when the motor of a refrigerator shuts
off and one has the impression that it has been on for a while
previous to that moment (Block, 1996). In other words, the expe-
rience was there but not fully accessible to consciousness (access
consciousness).
I agree with Lamme’s assertion that recurrent processing results
in phenomenal awareness and I would even agree with Lamme
that the FFS is unconscious, as we tend to think of consciousness.
The model I am proposing here, however, states that awareness
is produced by the FFS but it is in the form of individual bits of
visual awareness – unintegrated and not experienced as a whole.
The model holds that these individual bits of visual awareness
(qualia) exist independently of whether they are integrated into a
phenomenal conscious experience. Moreover, it is the integration
of a subset of all of these independent qualia through recurrent
processing that results in phenomenal consciousness. This pro-
posal requires us to think about consciousness in manner that is
bottom-up instead of top to bottom. Here we start with bits of
awareness (qualia) uniting to create a larger more comprehensive
form of awareness that we can think of as a high-level primate
visual experience.
Cases that support this perspective come from studies of
patients with visual agnosia. These patients have lost the ability
to recognize familiar objects and, in some cases, lose the abil-
ity to recognize even simple shapes. Milner reports the case of
patient D.F. who suffered from a severe form of agnosia result-
ing from carbon monoxide poisoning. D.F. retained an intact V1
and demonstrated an outstanding level of visual acuity as evi-
denced by her ability to distinguish between gray patches and
a ﬁne pattern of dots (Milner, 1991). Also, Zeki reports the
case of agnosia in a stroke victim resulting in a severe lesion
of the prestriate cortex (V2) while retaining an intact V1 (Zeki,
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1992). This individual could draw local features of objects (cor-
ners, line segments of speciﬁc orientation) but did not retain
the capacity to understand what was drawn. This patient could
even draw structures as complex as St. Paul’s Cathedral in Lon-
don and yet not understand the ﬁgure he had just rendered. Both
of these examples demonstrate that an intact V1 yields awareness
of local, small features as would be expected if activated ODCs
were creating qualia associated with speciﬁc locations of the visual
ﬁeld. Visual perception did arise in these patients, but this per-
ception seemed to manifest itself as independent bits of visual
awareness corresponding to local features. Since V1 remained
intact in these patients, we can infer that the integration of these
bits of awareness must occur through the action of extrastriate
cortices.
It is well established that extrastriate centers of the visual cor-
tex play a role in processing high-level visual information: V5 is
associated with motion processing, V4 plays a role in color and
form processing, and V3 activity relates most closely to dynamic
form processing (Zeki, 1978). In the model proposed here, these
centers are synthesizing these high-level experiences by recruiting
and integrating individual qualia produced inV1. A simple way of
thinking of this is that V1 provides the palette that is used by the
extrastriate centers (V5, V4, or V3) to paint our perceptive can-
vas. In addition, when these same centers emphasize or diminish
the contribution of certain V1 qualia, it is possible to focus our
perception on different aspects of the scene we see.
There is a signiﬁcant level of recurrent communication that
occurs between V1 and areas like V3, V4, and V5. It is likely that
the back projections from these extrastriate regions play a role in
integrating the qualia produced in V1. V1 activity is modulated
by extrastriate centers as monitored by functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Tong, 2003). Mehta
(2000) has shown that attentional modulation of neural activity
occurs after the initial transient response of V1, and that recur-
rent activation of V1 occurs after attentional effects of V4 and
the ITC. An interpretation is that feed-forward pathways from
V1 to extrastriate cortical regions supply a surfeit of informa-
tion and that recurrent pathways play a role in selecting and
integrating the bits of awareness used for conscious perception
(Figure 1).
This ties in well with the work of Logothetis and others demon-
strating that cells of the macaque monkey’sV1 do not respond well
to changes in perception due to binocular rivalry (Leopold and
Logothetis, 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997). These studies
present different and competing images to either eye of primates
that have been trained to respond when they see one image or
another. The primate pulls a lever or otherwise indicates when it
sees one image over the other while electrodes indicate the level
of activity of speciﬁed cortical cells. In this way, researchers can
tell when the primate’s perception has shifted and can correlate
this shift to changes in the activity of individual neurons. Logo-
thetis and others have shown that ∼90% of ITC cells,∼40% of the
cells of V5, ∼40% of V4 cells, and <20% of V1/V2 cells correlate
to changes in perception. Many have interpreted these results to
indicate that the macaque V1 is not playing a direct role in per-
ception since it appears that so few cells respond to changes in
perception.
FIGURE 1 |V1 receives stimuli from the geniculocortical pathway as
indicated by the arrows below. V3/V4/V5 corresponds to a generalized
higher visual center and q1-5 are qualia produced in V1. (A) Qualia from V1
supply a surfeit of information in feedforward pathways (FFS) to these
higher centers. (B) Extrastriate calculations select for output cells indicated
by small circles. The choice of output cells is key for the selection and
integration of speciﬁc qualia from V1. (C) Changing recruitment patterns of
extrastriate centers allow for changes in perception – compare to (B). This
can be monitored physiologically as shown by electrodes 1 and 2. The
output of calculations in extrastriate centers manifests as output cells with
speciﬁc recurrent pathways back to V1. Thus, we would expect the activity
of cells in extrastriate centers to change more signiﬁcantly than V1 since
the choice of output cells changes as calculation outputs and percepts vary
[compare electrodes 1 and 2 in (B,C)]. In addition, V1 cells continue to
receive input from the geniculocortical pathway and this would moderate
changes in activity of V1 cells.
In macaques, integration of individual qualia may depend on
changing extrastriate recruitment patterns and not in modulat-
ing the activity of individual ODCs within V1 (Kosslyn et al.,
2001). Thus, ODC activity should not change in response to
binocular rivalry since ODCs only become important to high-
level visual experiences as individual qualia are recruited by
extrastriate centers that integrate these bits of awareness and
create our overall perception. Referring to the painting exam-
ple above, imagine that a painter is working on two canvases
at the same time. The paints on the palette do not appear or
disappear in a canvas-dependent manner. The paints remain on
the palette even as the painter goes back and forth between can-
vases. The palette represents V1 activity. The extrastriate centers
correspond to what is happening on the canvases. If you mon-
itor activity at one of these canvases, you will notice that the
activity comes and goes depending on whether the painter is
working on that canvas. However, the activity of the palette
remains constant and does not change with the choice of canvas
(Figure 1).
Binocular rivalry studies in humans using fMRI have shown a
modulationofV1 in response to changes inperception. Inhumans,
recurrent pathwaysmay play a greater role inmodulating the activ-
ity of ODCs, and perhaps a mix of changing recruitment patterns
of extrastriate cortices and modulating ODC activity is used to
accentuate the contributions of speciﬁc ODCs in a given percept
(Polonsky et al., 2000; Tong and Engel, 2001).
DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON
In the “neurobiological theory of consciousness,” Francis Crick
and Christof Koch propose the ∼40 Hz oscillations observed
in the cerebral cortex are the means by which disparate bits of
information are bound together and that this oscillatory process
contributes to the formation of a conscious experience (Crick and
Koch, 2003).
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Crick and Koch’s theory of consciousness does not allow for
awareness to exist at smaller levels (i.e., qualia) and consid-
ers all the information-processing preceding binding to lack an
explicit experiential component. The qualia model differs with
this oscillatory-binding theory in that qualia are considered inde-
pendent units of awareness that exist whether or not they are
incorporated into a conscious experience. However, I believe it
is difﬁcult for humans to experience an individual quale and that
our visual phenomenal consciousness only arises after a signiﬁcant
number of these qualia have been integrated or bound together.
It is possible that the mechanism for the global-level binding of
qualia is the oscillatory mechanism proposed by Crick and Koch,
and consequently, these two theories may dovetail together at this
level (see below).
Many have argued that the neural activity of V1 cannot play
a signiﬁcant role in the direct experience of visual conscious-
ness (Silvanto, 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2008). For example, the
modulation of neural activity in higher visual centers like V5
or V4 in response to changes in perception seem to indicate
an active role in seeing a stimulus while the lack of perceptual
modulation in V1 activity in macaques indicates the striate cor-
tex has little to no role in the visual experience (Leopold and
Logothetis, 1996). As I have previously proposed, this result
could be interpreted as changing recruitment patterns of extras-
triate regions with V1 providing the basic units (qualia) for
recruitment.
A strong argument made by Zeki and Bartels (1999) against
the necessity of V1 in direct conscious experience is the well-
documented cases of visual awareness arising in patients with
blindsight. Since blindsight patients have signiﬁcant lesions in
V1, this special visual awareness (e.g., sensing fast motion) is
thought to bypass V1 through subcortical pathways. I would
contend that these studies indicate that some qualia may exist
outside of V1 but that this is the exception to the rule and not
the general case. For example, it is easy to imagine that a rapid
pathway for generating the sensation of fast motion from external
stimuli would yield a signiﬁcant selective advantage to organ-
isms that possessed it. The split second saved in such a case
would elicit the ﬁght or ﬂight response all the sooner and could
make a difference in surviving a predatory attack. It is possi-
ble there are other exceptions to the rule of qualia in V1 that
yield other advantages but these are special in nature and not the
general case.
Unlikemanyof the studies that try to associate visual experience
with extrastriate visual centers and beyond, Lamme has taken a
different approach and argued that it is not the speciﬁc location
as much as the direction of processing that matters. In his model,
the rapid ﬂow of information in the feedforward sweep (FFS) of
the geniculocortical pathway is an unconscious process while the
recurrent activation that occurs after an area is activated by the
FFS creates at least phenomenal consciousness. This is in line with
Mehta’s work, which demonstrates that attentional modulation of
neural activity occurs post the V1 FFS and is more closely related
to the recurrent activation of V1 by V4 and ITC (Mehta, 2000).
In addition, Lamme’s model proposes that phenomenal
awareness is gated by attention and that attention allows
phenomenal consciousness to move into access consciousness
(Lamme, 2003). As its name implies, this form of con-
sciousness provides access (verbal and other motor control)
to the items contained within it and it is what is most
commonly understood as a conscious experience. Lamme’s
model supports the idea that there are different levels of
consciousness.
The model I am proposing here holds that there is at least a
third level of “conscious” experience or awareness. This form of
awareness is very simple and small compared to our overall visual
experience but it exists as awareness whether it is integrated into a
larger experience or not. These bits of awareness are found in large
numbers inV1, although this does not preclude them fromexisting
in extrastriate cortical regions. Each quale is so small in compar-
ison to our usual visual experience that it may not seem to be a
form of awareness and this coincides with Lamme’s interpretation
of the FFS being unconscious.
Thus the FFS through V1 results in the production of qualia
associated with speciﬁc aspects of the scene we see – color, depth,
motion, and orientation at certain locations in our visual ﬁeld.
These are for the most part independent of each other and remain
so until extrastriate centers, through recurrent processing, recruit,
and integrate them into phenomenal sensory experiences. This
is an important point to make again. Individual qualia do not
correspond to phenomenal consciousness. It is only after many
individual qualia are integrated that phenomenal consciousness
arises. Changes in recruitment patterns of V1 qualia by extrastriate
centers result in different percepts being produced (e.g., binocular
rivalry) and it is these percepts that are competing for entrance
into access consciousness.
In their theoretical paper, Zeki and Bartels (1999) argue for
the existence of microconsciousnesses. This proposal parallels
the idea of qualia put forth in this paper in that we are all pos-
tulating the existence of smaller forms of visual awareness that
come together and contribute to the more complete form of
vision we experience. Zeki and Bartels base their proposal on
various features of visual processing including the observation
that several perceptual aspects like color, grating orientation, and
motion arise at different times. These authors have shown that
the asynchronous perception of these visual attributes (30–40 ms
between each) cause test-subjects to improperly associate visual
cues that correspond to these visual attributes. They use these
results along with a number of human studies looking at achro-
motopsia and akinotopsia to state that these attributes are being
produced and perceived independently of each other. Therefore,
each perceived visual attribute corresponds to an independent
microconsciousness.
Zeki and Bartels believe these microconsciousnesses arise from
the processing that takes place within each system devoted to
processing these speciﬁc attributes. For instance, the system
devoted to processing color, beginning with the blobs of V1
and continuing speciﬁcally through the thin stripes of V2 and
V4. Processing within this and other visual systems is known to
be hierarchical in that the cells activated by the FFS implicitly
contain the information of cells feeding into that cell. One con-
sequence of this multistage integration is that cells further along
in the system (compare V4 to V1) have much larger receptive
ﬁelds.
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Zeki and Bartels propose that the nodes of the color system
(e.g., the thin stripes of V2 and V4) produce microconscious-
nesses that incorporate what came before in the FFS through a
binding process they call generative binding. Thus, processing in
higher centers like V4 produces a microconsciousness that explic-
itly contains previously producedmicroconsciousnesses due to the
architecture of the color system. This would also apply to the other
systems devoted to attributes of vision like motion.
In contrast, the qualia model proposes that qualia (bits of
awareness) are produced in V1 by the FFS but not in the higher
visual centers. Instead, these higher centers use the implicit infor-
mation contained by them to inform the calculations taking
place in these centers with the eventual goal of selecting speciﬁc
reentrant pathways back to V1. Indeed, this is likely the reen-
trant activation described by Lamme that results in phenomenal
consciousness.
Another important difference between the two hypotheses is
that Zeki and Bartels never speciﬁcally deﬁne the neural structures
associated with producing microconsciousnesses. A core aspect of
the qualia hypothesis (as in nature) is that information always cor-
responds to a deﬁnite structure or gradients of some form. Qualia
are described here as the bits of awareness produced by neural cir-
cuits with speciﬁc topologies. These circuits exist in abundance in
the striate cortex and are known as ODCs. By deﬁning the basic
units of awareness in this way we create a condition that allows for
experimentation and a testing of this hypothesis (see the section
on proposed experiments).
Furthermore, Zeki and Bartels differentiate between the neu-
ral pathways of the FFS and the lateral or reentrant circuitry
back to V1 (Figure 2). Lateral circuitry being the interconnec-
tions between the various centers (e.g., V3, V4, V5) or different
areas of the same center. The authors state that the FFS con-
nects cells that process similar types of information they term
“like with like” activation. Thus, cells of V1 tuned to move-
ment of a speciﬁc direction will activate cells further on in the
FFS that are tuned to movement in the same direction. This
“like with like” activation clariﬁes why the FFS does not integrate
the disparate qualia produced in V1 but leaves qualia indepen-
dent at this stage of processing. In contrast, lateral or reentrant
circuitry is more diffuse in its activation and results in the phys-
ical integration of unlike stimuli (Shipp and Zeki, 1989 – both).
The authors call this integrative binding and they propose that
this is the means by which microconsciousnesses are brought
together.
The reentrant activation of V1 allows for the low-level integra-
tion of qualia. However, the function of lateral pathways within
and between higher visual centers is to calculate which cells of V1
are activated by the higher centers and not for binding microcon-
sciousnesses. Color constancy is a case in point. In this case, the
“like with like” activation proceeding through the FFS would need
to be modiﬁed since the perceived color for a given location of the
visual ﬁeld is different than that indicated by the light entering the
eye. The “cross-talk” occurring in the higher centers through lat-
eral pathways allows for these calculations to bemade and activates
the appropriate reentrant pathways to V1 from V4.
To demonstrate these points, I will describe a hypothetical
visual stimulus in which a green colored object is darkened by
FIGURE 2 | (A) Arrows indicate the feedforward sweep (FFS) moving from
the V1 onto extrastriate centers. FFS connectivity is of the “like with like”
form. (B) Back arrows indicate recurrent activation of V1 from extrastriate
centers: V3, V4, V5, and ITC. Circular arrows indicate lateral connectivity
within each center. X corresponds to the cross-talk (lateral circuitry)
between the centers. Recurrent and lateral connectivity is of the “diffuse”
form as indicated by Zeki and Bartels.
a shadow. Imagine that combining just three types of qualia pro-
duces all perceived color: red, blue, and green. In the process of
visualizing a scene, green wavelength light impinges at a certain
location of the visual ﬁeld and a green quale is produced at the
corresponding location of the striate cortex. This results from the
activation of the respective areas of V1 (ODCs in blobs) by the
visual processing pathway leading from the retinas to the occipital
cortex. Next, the color information is passed through the FFS up
through the thin stripes of V2 and onto V4. In V4, lateral process-
ing indicates that this location is in shadow through calculations
of the illumination ratios of the scene (Figure 3). The output of
these calculations is the activation of a speciﬁc cell or set of cells in
V4 with the appropriate reentrant neural pathways leading back to
V1. These pathways accentuate the original green qualia inV1 and
alsomodulate the activity of other local circuits that produce green,
red, and blue qualia. The extra qualia combine to form the equiv-
alent of white light and in combination with the original green
quale, produce a lighter shade of green4. The proximity of these
qualia within V1 (all corresponding to the same attribute – i.e.,
color) and the modulation of their activity, allow for these qualia
to be bound at a low-level. As stated above, reentrant pathways
are diffuse and this allows unlike qualia to be physically integrated
as part of the same activation process. Due to the well-known
structure of V1, the spatial relationship of all qualia is implicitly
encoded within each quale produced and proximal qualia can be
integrated at a local level since they represent close points in the
visual ﬁeld. Note that this spatial synchronization of qualia still
allows for the temporal asynchrony observed by Zeki and Bartels
since different attributes of vision (motion, grating orientation)
can arrive independently at V1.
Keliris et al. (2010) have recently published a paper studying
perceptually correlated modulation of V1 activity. By using binoc-
ular ﬂash suppression they were able to monitor the activity of
neurons in macaques and correlate these modulations of neural
4The qualia model offers a simple means by which the visual cortex can control hue,
saturation, and luminance. Hue can be adjusted by changing the relative ratios of
red, green, and blue qualia in a percept. Adding triplets of red, blue, and green qualia
or removing them as triplets controls illumination. Finally, adding or decreasing the
number of red, blue, and green qualia in a percept while maintaining the relative
ratios of each governs saturation.
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FIGURE 3 | A possible circuit describing color constancy. (A) A colored
stimulus elicits the FFS through the blob cells of V1, thin stripe cells of V2
and onto the thin stripes of V4. (B) Complex calculations of illumination
ratios select for the activation of a speciﬁc output cell or set of cells from
V4. (C) Each output cell will have a speciﬁc feedback pathway back to V1.
Activation of this feedback pathway will modify the activity in V1 in speciﬁc
ways and allow for the local integration of proximal qualia as part of the
same feedback process. The modulation of V1 circuit activity results in
qualia achieving the correct oscillatory range or to fall out of the correct
range for binding to occur.
activity to changes in perception. Monkeys in these studies were
shown gratings with orthogonal orientations to either eye at the
same locations of the visual ﬁeld. Similar to previous binocular
rivalry studies with macaques, the authors found that approx-
imately 20% of V1 cells demonstrated changes in their spiking
frequency as a function of perceptual changes.
This level of modulation is what we would expect if we were
trying to modify a percept and not necessarily create a new one
as described above in the example for color constancy. Reentrant
pathways modulate the activity of V1 and either enhance or sup-
press the spiking frequency of cells. It is possible that these mod-
ulatory effects push circuits into or out of the correct oscillatory
range (Crick andKoch – see above) for binding to occur. As circuits
enter a suitable oscillatory range, their respective qualia are bound
to the percept. Conversely, when circuits fall out of the appropriate
oscillatory range, their corresponding qualia are removed from the
percept. Thus, modulation of activity in V1 leads to the integra-
tion and binding of the speciﬁc qualia to be included in a percept.
At the point that a threshold number of qualia are bound, phe-
nomenal consciousness arises. From this description we can see
that phenomenal consciousness is quantitatively and qualitatively
distinct from the individual qualia contained within it. Beyond the
large number of qualia that comprise phenomenal consciousness,
this form of consciousness also includes an implicit awareness
of the spatial and temporal relationships of the qualia that
contribute to it.
In the 1980s Bernard Baars proposed that consciousness arises
through the action of the global workspace. He originally pre-
sented this idea in his book A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness
(Baars, 1988). As he described it, the global workspace serves as a
centralized location from which disparate information processors
can retrieve information and to which they can broadcast their
output. Although the information processors are not conscious
in and of themselves, the global workspace is conscious and it
contains all the diverse elements of consciousness. Baars’ cogni-
tive psychological approach to describing consciousness has been
extended by others (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al.,
2006) to include models that reproduce some proposed properties
of a global workspace. For example, Dehaene et al. (2006) specify
that activation of associative areas like the prefrontal and anterior
cingulate cortices create a reverberating neuronal assembly with
a long lasting reverberation that extends temporally past the ini-
tial stimulus. In addition, the authors deﬁne states (subliminal,
preconscious) that are precursors to access consciousness (global
workspace) but whose content does not necessarily enter access
consciousness.
Although the global workspace model addresses many of the
resonant, associative, and other properties thought to be part of
access consciousness; it does not address what it is about these
processes that result in conscious awareness. Consciousness is
attributed to the global workspace and when unconscious infor-
mation processors supply their contents to the global workspace
(access consciousness) this information becomes conscious. But
what makes the global workspace conscious?
The qualia model avoids this problem because it proposes that
the information reaching access consciousness is already aware
or conscious (qualia, phenomenal consciousness). The question
ceases to be “How does information become conscious as it moves
from non-conscious preprocessing centers to access consciousness
(the global workspace)?” and becomes“How are smaller, indepen-
dent forms of consciousness (qualia, phenomenal consciousness)
incorporated into access consciousness?”
Most importantly, the quality that is changing here is whether
the material contained by a conscious state is reportable. Dehaene
and others maintain the belief in the existence of consciousness
without the ability to report is based on the illusory “intuition
that visual awareness includes a richness of content that goes
beyond what we can report” (Dehaene et al., 2006). However, it
is clear from cases of locked-in syndrome that conscious states
can exist without report. Individuals with total locked-in syn-
drome have lost all voluntary muscle control but remain conscious
(Schnakers et al., 2009). Thus conscious states can exist without
the ability to report and reportability is not a requirement for
consciousness.
In biological systems, we ﬁnd basic units coming together to
form more complex systems, which in turn contribute to systems
of even greater complexity. These systems all contain top-down
and bottom-up control mechanisms and at the highest levels
result in very sophisticated processes that seem quite different
from the properties of their basic units. All organs of the human
body adhere to these principles and evolution has selected for all
of these systems to operate in this way. The qualia model pro-
poses that awareness operates in a similar fashion. Here we have
the basic units (qualia) coming together to form the more com-
plex phenomenal consciousness, which itself contributes to access
consciousness. Access consciousness has the unique property of
reportability due to its access to motor centers but this does not
negate the existence of independent and simpler forms of visual
consciousness or visual awareness in previous steps along this
pathway (Figure 4).
PROPOSED EXPERIMENTS
If qualia exist, their corresponding circuits must be observable
in biological systems. I believe that qualia circuits or parts of
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FIGURE 4 | A conceptual map of the relationship of qualia,
phenomenal consciousness, and access consciousness. Individual
qualia (small circles) produced in V1 are bound together into phenomenal
consciousness (larger light gray circles) by achieving the correct oscillatory
range. Note the phenomenal conscious state shown below in this ﬁgure
excludes many qualia that are not incorporated into this state (small circles
to the left). Lamme and others postulate entrance into access
consciousness (largest dark gray circle) is gated through attention and it is
likely these phenomenal states (other light gray circles) compete for
entrance into access consciousness (e.g., Necker cube). As phenomenal
consciousness becomes part of access consciousness, it joins with the
many qualia (small circles to the right) that are already part of access
consciousness. Models describing the global workspace (Dehaene et al.,
2006) include properties (resonance between prefrontal areas and
posterior visual centers) that address the mechanism by which visual
phenomenal conscious states are integrated into access consciousness.
qualia circuits have already been detected, but the appropriate the-
oretical framework has not existed to completely interpret these
results. I have argued that qualia exist in the striate cortex, but
they may exist in other areas throughout the brain. The micro-
scopic scale that corresponds to the activity of a few hundred to
thousands of cells is bordered by technologies used to study the
activity of a few cells (electrodes) and larger regions of neural
activity: positron emission tomography (PET), fMRI, and magne-
toencephalography (MEG). The rate of advancement in the ﬁeld
of detecting neural activity is such that it will become possible in
the near future to detect the activation and topology of individual
circuits.
The ﬁrst step in this line of research would be to determine
if there is indeed a recurring set of ocular dominance column
topologies within the human striate cortex. Given recent advances
in imaging technology, it should be possible to do this within the
next decade if not sooner. For example, the Human Brain Project
has produced a detailed map of the human brain by generating
7400 slices (20 μm thick) of a human brain and then imaging
each through histological staining and microscopy. Slices were
digitized and reassembled in silico to generate a cellular level map
of the brain (Amunts et al., 2013). Thismassive database is publicly
available and might prove suitable for the ﬁne-grained structural
analysis required to identify repeating circuit topologies. Another
example of a publicly available database is The Human Connec-
tome Project (HCP). HCP provides diffusion tensor data (DTI)
of the axonal connections between centers of the cerebral cortex
(Rosen et al., 2010). This project may prove useful in probing the
connections between the higher visual centers and V1 in great
detail. One desired product from these ﬁne-grained studies is a list
of the number and type of unique circuit topologies represented
in the striate cortex.
Given the existence of a recurring set of neural circuit topolo-
gies within the striate cortex, the next step would be to establish a
correlation between speciﬁc visual stimuli and each of these recur-
ring circuit topologies. An example would be to shine points of
light of a certain color (red, blue, or green) at speciﬁed locations
of a subject’s visual ﬁeld. It should be possible to determine the
structure of activated circuits within the striate cortex by using
techniques like high-ﬁeld fMRI. Key to this line of research is the
reporting of the observed color that would allow identiﬁed neural
circuit topologies to be correlated to internal subjective experi-
ences. Of special interest in these studieswould be to see if combin-
ing the activity of two distinct neural circuits can produce colors.
For example, can activating circuits previously associated with the
colors red and green create the subjective experience of the color
yellow?
Although high-ﬁeld fMRI would allow researchers to corre-
late speciﬁc circuit topologies to reproducible internal experiences
(qualia), determining causation would require the use of transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to precisely disrupt certain cir-
cuits implicated in producing qualia. This would allow researchers
to see if eliminating the activation of certain circuits interrupts
the production of the visual experience. Conversely, it would be
interesting to investigate if the speciﬁc activation of ODC neu-
ral circuits (with TMS) of known circuit topologies would result
in the subjective experience of exclusively one type of colored
light.
To demonstrate that these circuit topologies are found through-
out the animal kingdom, these studies must be extended into
model systems like zebra ﬁsh. Muto et al. (2013) have recently
demonstrated that it is possible to visualize circuit activation
through transgenic expression of GCaMP. This research group
observed Ca2+ transients produced in embryo zebraﬁsh in the
absence and presence of their natural prey paramecium. As a
result, these researchers identiﬁed the speciﬁc circuit structure
activated by the paramecium. In a similar fashion, it should be
possible to determine if circuits with speciﬁc topologies are repro-
ducibly activated in response to colored stimuli and to catalog the
structures of these circuits. Studies in other model systems like
mice are also producing descriptions of the detailed structure of
visual circuits (Bock et al., 2011). In their recent paper, Bock et al.
(2011) described the structure of activated visual cortex circuits
through the combined use of light microscopy with the calcium
indicator BAPTA 1-AM (OGB) followed by serial-section trans-
mission electron microscopy (TEM). Through these techniques,
Bock et al. (2011) generated a line-orientation preference map
with detailed structural information about the neural cells and
circuits within this section of cortex. In the same way, it should be
possible to generate a color preference map that gives detailed
structural information about the circuits activated by color
stimuli.
The proposed qualia hypothesis predicts that at least some of
the same circuit topologies activated by visual stimuli in humans
should be found in various animal models since these topologies
are not species speciﬁc. By creating a catalog of circuit topolo-
gies across many species and relating them to speciﬁc stimuli, we
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will create the foundation for understanding visual awareness and
perhaps primary sensori-motor consciousness in general. It will
also become possible to ask questions relating to the evolution
of visual awareness and the distribution of qualia throughout the
kingdom Animalia.
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, there have been numerous attempts to
understand visual awareness through elaborate top-down math-
ematical models. For example, Giulio Tononi has borrowed
concepts from the ﬁeld of information theory and puts forth the
idea that we produce speciﬁc internal impressions by a process
of making a large number of distinctions. “Not this but that”
repeated many times results in only one possible answer (Tononi,
2008; Tononi andKoch, 2008). Itmay be that these ideas accurately
describe the means by which we recognize percepts, but I believe
this type of computational process must occur at later and higher
stages of image processing than the production of qualia. Qualia
are produced early and create the fundamental percept ﬁrst. As
these percepts enter access consciousness they can then be com-
pared to previously experienced percepts and this would require
the types of distinctions that Tononi describes. So it may be pos-
sible these two hypotheses are complementary and not mutually
exclusive.
In contrast to the several top-down approaches proposed over
the past few decades, the model I put forth here is a bottom-up
proposal. In some ways, this model aligns with Chalmers’ idea that
there are fundamental entities in nature that need to be accepted
as such (Chalmers, 1995). He postulates that consciousness is one
such case and I believe this manifests as a fundamental unit of
awareness deﬁned here as a quale. In this case, it is the topology
of neural excitation itself that is a simple form of awareness. Like
any other biological system it is the structure that determines the
function. This tenet holds throughout all biological systems and I
believe this serves as a signiﬁcant argument for the same applying
to awareness.
Quantized visual awareness is consistent with what we know
of biological systems and the generation of complexity. Basic sets
of building blocks are used to create a huge variety of intricate
structures in biology. Given the unpredictable and incalculable
number of visual states produced in primates, it seems logical
that an approach that used basic building blocks like qualia would
prove advantageous.
This hypothesis enhances our ability to study visual and other
forms of awareness. By establishing the existence of quantized
awareness, we are liberated to look for and catalog the various
forms of qualia and eventually analyze each individually to under-
stand how their form leads to function. This approach puts aware-
ness squarely into the realm of established scientiﬁc principles and
approaches.
Qualia are likely found throughout the animal kingdom. We
know there are a wide variety of nervous systems across the king-
dom Animalia. However, this does not preclude the existence of
rudimentary forms of awareness in many of these animals. We no
longer need a whole brain but just small circuits of hundreds to
thousands of neurons with speciﬁc topologies. Indeed, this may
be at the heart of the evolution of visual awareness. Paleobiolog-
ical studies clearly show that early animals were small and much
simpler than the most complex forms that exist today (Butterﬁeld,
2007). Nervous systems arose early in the animal kingdom and
likely had roles in movement and mechanical responses to stimuli.
It is much easier to imagine how a simple form of awareness like
a single quale could have arisen in early animals if we accept the
idea of quantized awareness.
Although V1 represents one highly structured way of organiz-
ing qualia, we should not expect that qualia would be arranged in
the same way in other animals. Indeed, the striate cortex, as we
have come to understand it, is found in only a subset of mammals.
Thus the question of the presence or absence of qualia in any spe-
ciﬁc organism can be separated from the presence or absence of
structureslike V1.
Wehave remained tethered to vision in our discussion of aware-
ness because the visual system is the most thoroughly studied
sensory system. If qualia exist for vision, however, they likely exist
for other sensory modalities. For instance, the gustatory pathway
gives us ﬁve distinct types of tastes that could easily correspond to
individual qualia. These ﬁve are the common sweet, bitter, sour,
salty, and umami. The primary gustatory cortex is composed of
sections of cortex called the frontal operculum on the inferior
frontal gyrus of the frontal lobe and the anterior insula of the
insular lobe (Bushnell et al., 2007). Although these regions are not
as well understood asV1 they may well contain neural circuits that
produce qualia.
Similarly the somatosensory system responds to stimuli from
various types of receptors: mechanoreceptors, chemoreceptors,
thermoreceptors, and nociceptors. One can imagine either a one
Table 1 |Table of sensory qualia.
Sensory modality
Qualia type Visual Gustatory Tactile Auditory Olfactory
1 Color-1 (red?) Sour Mechano Various evolutionarily
determined frequency qualia
Various evolutionarily
determined odorant qualia2 Color-2 (blue?) Salty Chemo
3 Color-3 (green?) Umami Thermo
4 Motion (various) Bitter Pain
5 Depth Sweet
6 Grating orientation (various)
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to one correspondence with qualia or perhaps a limited number
of variant qualia for each. Although it may seem overly simplistic,
a natural consequence of the model proposed here is that the
complex, rich, and distinct experiences that we humans share arise
through varying the number and combinations of a limited set of
qualia types. This leads us to a starting point for the creation of a
Table of Qualia (Table 1).
The descriptions given in this paper are by necessity a ﬁrst
approximation, a starting point. With time and experimentation,
the model described in this communication will be reshaped and
modiﬁed. The true value of the qualia model proposed here is not
that it has the ﬁnal word in how visual awareness comes into being
but that it fundamentally changes the questions that can be asked
and the approach taken to study visual and other forms of sensory
awareness.
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